The Working Catholic: Social Sin Part II by Bill Droel

 

Although social sin is Catholic doctrine, it rarely appears in sacrament preparation classes nor is it normally mentioned during the sacrament of reconciliation.

Slavery, for example, is a social sin even if every Christian plantation owner had been kind, even if the pharaoh of olden times had not been cruel and harsh. “Institutions, laws and modes of thinking and feeling are handed down from previous generations,” explains Vatican II (1962-1965). A bad system (like a good institution) has a certain momentum or independent character.  Bad institutions make holiness difficult. Good institutions serve as reminders for upright behavior.

Poverty is a social sin. Although a poor person, like anyone else, might steal or lie, it is not their poverty that is a sin. The sin is an economic structure that perpetuates significant and needless poverty. We don’t think about social sin, says Vatican II, because we are plagued with an individualistic mentality. But we cannot “content [ourselves] with merely individualistic morality.” Christians must promote and assist “institutions dedicated to bettering the conditions of human life.”

It is true that social sin is somewhat metaphorical, says the Vatican’s 2004 Compendium of the Social Doctrine. Social sin does not weaken or cancel “the personal component by admitting only social guilt and responsibility. At the bottom of every situation of sin is always the individual who sins.” At the same time this metaphorical sense cannot overtake the objectively sinful nature of some systems. The Compendium mentions wages, the fairness of which “is the most important means for achieving justice in work relationships.” It “is not sufficient [for] an agreement between employee and employer with regard to the amount of pay… to qualify as a just wage.” In a given circumstance it so happens that an employer or an employee may have a reason for substandard wages. The morality of a wage is, however, determined objectively, apart from the motives of employer and employee.

How then can social sin be brought into the sacrament of reconciliation? It would seem that a creative liturgy planner in the parish could devise a service each Lent about our society’s social sins—things for which we collectively bear responsibility. Suggestions are welcome.

  Another way to get at this notion of social sin is to consider its antibodies. To counter individual sin, we summon a specific virtue.  If, for example, my individual sin is neglect of family members, I make a habit of generosity around the home during Lent. If the habit persists after Easter, it becomes my individual virtue.

 An institution is a social virtue. Specific virtues (social habits) are designed to counter social sin. The Compendium mentions solidarity as a social virtue about relationships that tend toward ethical-social improvement. Virtues are not feelings. Solidarity, the Compendium continues, is not a distant touch of compassion for the afflicted. It is a commitment to act with others for the sake of the common good. 

Social Justice is a social virtue. The term is often used generically to cover outreach efforts, government distribution programs and protesting. The term is also used to describe crusading individuals, some lobbyists and those with sincere intentions. However, in Catholicism social justice is a specific type of the general virtue of justice. It is a collective virtue; an individual cannot practice social justice. Its intent is the improvement of institutions or policies. Its unique act is organization; that is, people finding like-minded others and then applying tactics and strategies for the good of the commons. In mainstream Catholicism social justice usually happens during the weekday within normal settings. It is not normally an on-and-off weekend activity by outsiders to an institution, though those efforts can be needed.  Social justice is participation. It requires many hands, feet and minds. As it evolves, a sound social justice effort likewise increases participation.  Employees have a surge of morale because of their reform efforts. Professionals increase their dedication because through their association they instituted a reform.

Social justice (a collective habit) is a primary vaccine against social sin. It is the means for bettering the conditions of human life. Because each exercise of social justice is less than 100% effective, it requires booster shots. All institutions need a little social justice during Lent and a little more during Eastertide and then another dose in all the weeks after Pentecost.

Droel is the author of What Is Social Justice (National Center for the Laity, PO Box 291102, Chicago, IL 60629; $5)

 

The Working Catholic: Social Sin By Bill Droel

  

Lent is the time for particular attention to sinfulness. Yet this year as in years past an increasing number of Catholics and others forego participation in the sacrament of reconciliation (aka confession). Why?

The dominant explanation is that workaday Christians simply do not feel sinful. Our culture is saturated with psychological language about self-fulfillment, replacing the language of evil. Yesterday’s poor behavior is merely a step on the way to a better self. As particularly related to sinfulness, the insights of addition theory, including the notion of denial, contribute to an assumption that foibles or weaknesses are just part of coping with stress. Addiction theory—normally quite helpful—is often enough wrongly appropriated as victim theory. In that guise it says bad actions are not immoral and surely not worth taking into a confessional. Bishop Fulton Sheen (1895-1979) often preached on this tension between psychology and sin. This was also the theme of Karl Menninger’s book, Whatever Became of Sin (Hawthorn, 1973).

An overlooked cause for the decline in individual sacramental confession is the penitential rite that occurs during every Mass. That is, worshipers properly conclude that their routine sins are forgiven in a sacramental way during the liturgy. Their conclusion, by the way, can be reached implicitly because the liturgy itself carries its efficacy.

The decline in the individual-style (aka “in the box”) sacrament of reconciliation might give an opening to consider social sin. In recent months many opinion leaders have pointed to the structural or systemic nature of several problems. Many institutions are confronting and reforming policies or habits that perpetuate serious social wrongs—offices that tolerate harassment of women, legislatures that allow corruption as a normal part of “getting things done,” Church officialdom that covers up for deviant personnel, a police fellowship that tacitly approves of misbehavior, etc. However, simply calling out a social sin seems to present more questions than opportunities.

There are four conditions for sin:

§  There must be behavior. Thinking about adultery, for example, is a grave temptation but not yet a sin. The person must minimally contact the other (one or both of whom is married to another). Suggestive flirting (the behavior) is the first step into adultery.

§  The behavior must be objectively wrong. Although there’s a connection, guilt feelings are not the same as sin. Even in our libertine culture, some people confess matters that are not objectively sinful. Such scrupulosity includes those who confess the very same sinful incident a second time. Though guilt feelings may linger, a single confession bestows definitive forgiveness for a particular incident.

§  The objectively wrong behavior must be done knowingly. It is possible to honestly be ignorant of right and wrong; pre-school children, for example, or sometimes the mentally challenged. Rationalization, however, is a sin; as in “I didn’t know our company didn’t allow bribery.”

§  The objectively wrong behavior must be done willingly. It has to be an outcome of complete free will.

As we become aware of defective structures, the notion of social sin makes some sense. Racism, for example, is a social sin. But who is the sinner? What is the behavior? Oh yes, there are many culpable individuals who do sinfully racist things. For example, there is the person who joins a white supremacy group and promotes its message on the internet or during an insurrection at the U.S. Capitol. This behavior is an individual sin, but it is also a product of our shameful history and is reinforced by anti-Black sentiment embedded in some local institutions. So who commits the social sin? Is it the supremacist group?

Further, once a social sin is named, how does confession and forgiveness occur? Is there, let’s say, structural grace? Several small civic and church groups now meet (usually in cyberspace) to discuss race relations. This can be an exercise in consciousness-raising, but what is the practical outcome? Did the group knowingly and willingly engage in any behavior (not guilt feelings) that it can confess as sinful? Can the group make any amends for structures of racism? For example, can the group integrate their neighborhood or a local school?

Despite its initial difficulties, let’s not yet give up on this idea of social sin. To be continued…

Droel edits INITIATIVES (PO Box 291102, Chicago, IL 60629), a newsletter about faith and work.